Transparency

The Warrant Canary.

A scheduled statement. If it stops updating, that may be a signal worth noticing.

Some legal demands can come with an order forbidding us from mentioning them. A warrant canary is a common approach: we aim to publish a signed statement on a schedule for as long as it remains true. This isn't a legal guarantee — legal scholars debate how enforceable canaries are — and a missed or late update is not proof of any particular cause. It is a verifiable signal, and we think a small one is better than none.

Part one

Proof this statement is current

A signed statement is worthless if someone can quietly keep republishing an old one after it stops being true. Every canary statement we publish references that day's date alongside a real, independently verifiable news headline — something that would be hard to predict or pre-sign in advance. If the referenced headline doesn't check out against that day's actual news, treat the statement as not current, whatever the date on it claims.

Part two

The signed statement

Last confirmed: 2026-10-10
Proof of life — referenced headline, published 2026-10-10: Twelve killed in attack on airport in Saudi capital Riyadh
Previous statement hash (SHA-256): A38D1B06253B2B05F3DF0A9977754D21E897A781CB89F5A580EB3AA489FE8A27
Signed by: Andrew Pokrandt, Founder
Verify this statement: our published key · download the exact signed file

As of the date above, Prevon has not received:

A National Security Letter
An order under 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)
A FISA court order or directive
A gagged subpoena of any kind
Any legal demand to introduce a backdoor, master key, or weakened encryption

Verify it yourself — three commands, no account or special software beyond GPG:

Import our public key:curl -s https://prevon.ai/pubkey.asc | gpg --import
Verify the statement:curl -s https://prevon.ai/canary/statement-2026-10-10.txt.asc | gpg --verify -
Confirm the output says Good signature from Andrew Pokrandt and the fingerprint matches 04C5 42AD 5676 0E08 8B4E 88AC 5428 1D1B 0CF7 3C41. If either doesn't match, don't trust the statement — and tell us.

The full statement, as signed:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

PREVON WARRANT CANARY STATEMENT
Date: 2026-10-10

Last confirmed: 2026-10-10

Proof of life - referenced headline, published 2026-10-10:
"Twelve killed in attack on airport in Saudi capital Riyadh"
Source: BBC News - https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cw33x4y8k82no?at_medium=RSS&at_campaign=rss

Previous statement hash (SHA-256): A38D1B06253B2B05F3DF0A9977754D21E897A781CB89F5A580EB3AA489FE8A27

As of the date above, Prevon has not received:
- - A National Security Letter
- - An order under 18 U.S.C. Section 2705(b)
- - A FISA court order or directive
- - A gagged subpoena of any kind
- - Any legal demand to introduce a backdoor, master key, or weakened encryption

Transparency log (cumulative):
- - National Security Letters received: 0
- - Orders under 18 U.S.C. Section 2705(b) received: 0
- - FISA court orders or directives received: 0
- - Gagged subpoenas received: 0
- - Demands to weaken or backdoor encryption received: 0
- - User accounts affected by any of the above: 0

Signed by: Andrew Pokrandt, Founder
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEBMVCrVZ2DgiLToisVCgdGwz3PEEFAmrK/TkACgkQVCgdGwz3
PEGopg/+LECi/wETt8EpRzl/yfWTEmVQ9q2azzzKxGJ0PypdDBdE3JQ5dxsSoi11
mJJwo5lFhq1E4jcXXVjS2bh77CldEKpBILLWSW6bodJtemSItnCl3LepB4Gvnzpd
qFO3mqp+VAX4dNhYo0Uk535jAfiqHZs/OSGRgdvnWSwuJf+edRsZqAlje2RrxEL+
yCEfNFqMQVkhcp9tE9ulzGt29LGxSC13GJBz2ax5yr2rcV1asWIZbA04NponU6oe
3oSJhEz7TiAxzviV+VV9jhEQAoPUg5ikpDvh2YwYLg8S0y2/y52f66OUm/Kw8Y4y
+WRqQEnEijjyd/KS8rgcPgvuFVxDPhgE6U3aN1uFK5Vv8WFBgPMzfDBW6AogPKoK
vF00sXs+o6l6h5ZpZfLDdgTkqBqCAIxQ1pzz0+wev6h9tBl5j+eqXVYxoAFwIbdC
lkROEzE9P2nG4A1+IO0RFtGLHHLouxLDOX8D49fEgwLXsD3RXhHdRm8GukL1dLW5
JqmDaNUMQu7lri+YwEmn993NdG+3YWmyFh/8EEhVrgp2Y60A/T0KCZg2FlSA1ahj
bnPR/LcisCSwU8ylMOn+s1C5cTLQuPpRgiUX9xTbIpf7CamVXFzfyvE+lxoTlzdI
jPdf3tN+9ESfelUnzGPXTwxv0hoZfRZEk9sbN9Dqmvp1xERvVmQ=
=86WA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Part three

The transparency log

Beyond the plain yes/no canary above, we track and publish a running count of every legal request in each category below, updated at every scheduled signing. A rising number here is not itself alarming — it's the difference between a real, maintained transparency practice and a canary nobody actually keeps current.

National Security Letters received	0
Orders under 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) received	0
FISA court orders or directives received	0
Gagged subpoenas received	0
Demands to weaken or backdoor encryption received	0
User accounts affected by any of the above	0

How it works

Each statement references the hash of the one before it, so the history is chained and a quiet edit after the fact should be detectable. View the complete archive: /warrant-canary/archive.

We're not making any claim about what a missing or late update would mean — this section just explains the mechanism.

This is not legal advice, a warranty, or a guarantee that no demand has ever been made outside the categories listed. Contact us with questions.